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Earnings management within Europe: the
effects of member state audit environment,
audit firm quality and international capital
markets
Steven J. Maijoor and Ann Vanstraelen*
Abstract—This paper studies earnings management in a European context. More specifically, the effects of three
factors on earnings management within Europe are studied: member state audit environment, audit firm quality and
presence in international capital markets. The national audit environments within Europe vary strongly in terms of
independence rules and auditor liability. Hence, it can be expected that the restrictions imposed by national audit
environments on earnings management vary. However, there are two factors that can mitigate the national audit en-
vironment effect: Big Four audit firm quality and a company's reliance on international capital markets. Using data
for the period 1992-2000 from listed firms in three EU countries with clearly distinct audit environments (Erance,
Germany and the UK), we have the following main findings. Eirst, a stricter audit environment reduces the magni-
tude of earnings management, irrespective of the type of auditor (Big Eour audit firm or non-Big Eour audit firm).
Second, there is no evidence of an international Big Eour audit quality effect in Europe. Third, a company's reliance
on international capital markets does not limit its earnings management .The evidence provided in this study is rel-
evant for the current debate in the European Union on the harmonisation of auditing. Eor the comparability of earn-
ings, not only is the standardisation of financial reporting important but also the standardisation of enforcement
mechanisms, as embodied in the national audit environment and the quality of audit firms. The results of this study
suggest that the enforcement of financial reporting still varies strongly across member states of the EU.
1. Introduction
This study examines the effects on earnings man-
agement of differences in EU member states' audit
environments, audit firm quality and reliance on
international capital markets. Our paper con-
tributes to the literature in three ways. First, Gore
et al. (2001) pointed out that there is an 'increasing
interest in the impact of different economic envi-
ronments and GAAP regimes on the attributes of
accounting earnings (Pope and Walker, 1999; Ali
and Hwang, 2000; Ball et al., 2000), and on the in-
cidence of earnings and forecast management
(Brown and Higgins, 2001; Leuz et al., 2003)'.
Our paper contributes to this increasing interest by
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analysing the incidence of earnings management
in three European countries: France, Germany, and
the UK. These three countries clearly vary in terms
of their audit environment (independence rules
and auditor liability). These three countries are
also the originating countries of three distinct legal
traditions: French code law, German code law and
English common law (LaPorta et al., 1998).' We
study the effect of differences in national audit en-
vironments on the magnitude of earnings manage-
ment. Second, given that there is strong evidence
in the US of Big Four audit firm conservatism (e.g.
Becker et al., 1998), we consider whether Big
Four'^ auditors constitute a constraint on earnings
management in the three European countries under
study and if so, whether this quality effect over-
rides differences as a result of national audit envi-
ronments. In other words, to what extent do the
international Big Four audit firms provide a stan-
dardised high quality audit across different juris-
dictions within Europe? Finally, we consider
whether a listing on the New York Stock Exchange
' Eor a detailed description of the legal and accounting en-
vironment of these three countries, we refer to Giner and Rees
(2001).
^ Eor convenience, this paper uses the term 'Big Four audi-
tor' to identify the large international audit firm networks.
Some of the studies referred to were conducted before the
mergers resulted in a reduction to four international audit firm
networks.34 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
(NYSE) influences the incidence of earnings man-
agement. The effect of a listing on an internation-
al capital market can be twofold. A foreign
exchange listing might result in additional regula-
tory requirements reducing national opportunities
for earnings management. However, international
capital market pressures might also give addition-
al incentives for increasing the level of earnings
management. The net effect of these opposing
forces is, a priori, unclear.
The results of this study are relevant for the cur-
rent discussion on the comparability of financial
statements within the EU, and specifically the
comparability of earnings. It is assumed that the
implementation of the 4th and 7th Directive has in-
creased the comparability of financial statements
within the EU. Further, expectations are that the
requirement for listed companies in the EU to
apply International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) for the consolidated financial statements as
of the year 2005 will further increase comparabil-
ity of earnings. However, the comparability of
earnings reported not only depends on the set of
accepted accounting standards, but also on the na-
tional quality of audits and the constraints imposed
on earnings management by the national audit en-
vironment. So far, the standardisation of national
auditing laws and regulations within the European
Union has been rather limited (Buijink et al.,
1996).
Related to this issue is whether the Big Four
audit firms provide the same audit quality across
countries. While the minimum levels of national
audit quality might vary from country to country,
it could be argued that the Big Four audit firms
have strong incentives to provide the same high
audit quality level in different countries. The rea-
son is that their clients attract capital from interna-
tional markets, and even national audit failures
will affect their international reputation.
The main findings of this study are the follow-
ing. First, the magnitude of earnings management
across countries in the EU appears to be a function
of differences in national audit environments. In
particular, the results suggest that companies in a
country with a strict audit quality regime engage
less in earnings management compared to compa-
nies in a country with a more flexible audit regime.
Second, the presence of a Big Four auditor cannot
override the observed differences in level of earn-
ings management as a result of the national audit
environment. In addition, the Big Four audit qual-
ity effect is not found to be uniform across
European countries. Finally, the results regarding
the reliance on international capital markets sug-
gest that a cross-listing on the NYSE does not con-
strain earnings management but rather is
associated with a higher level of abnormal work-
ing capital accruals. Overall, these results imply
that stricter auditor independence regulation can
increase earnings quality, that there is no global
Big Four audit quality effect in Europe, and that
the bonding role of SEC regulation does not limit
earnings management of European companies.
The remainder of this paper is organised as fol-
lows. In Section 2, we review relevant previous lit-
erature. In Section 3, we develop our research
hypotheses. The differences in audit environment
between France, Germany and the UK are de-
scribed in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 describe the
sample selection procedure and the research de-
sign. In Sections 7 and 8, we present the empirical
results of the tnain analysis and sensitivity analy-
ses. Finally, we draw conclusions, address limita-
tions of the study and give suggestions for future
research.
2. Previous literature
2.1. International differences in earnings
management
Ball et al. (2000) suggest that the demand for ac-
counting earnings is systematically different in
code-law countries compared to common-law
countries. Common-law countries are charac-
terised by: transactions at 'arms-length'; a diverse
base of investors; and a relatively high risk of liti-
gation. In code-law countries, capital markets are
less active. Companies are more financed by
banks, other financial institutions and the govern-
ment, which results in less need for public disclo-
sure. Moreover, litigation rates are relatively low.
Daske et al. (2003) provide evidence that disconti-
nuities in the distribution of earnings are more pro-
nounced in code-law countries, and especially in
German accounting origin countries, compared to
the US and the UK. Hence, earnings management
and loss avoidance practices appear to be more
prevalent in companies from code-law countries
compared to companies from common-law coun-
tries.
Leuz et al. (2003) provide evidence suggesting
that companies in countries with developed equity
markets, dispersed ownership structures, strong in-
vestor rights and legal enforcement engage in less
earnings management.
Coppens and Peek (2005) examine earnings
management by private companies in Europe.
They find that private European companies in
countries with low financial and tax alignment
avoid small losses, and that private European com-
panies in countries with high financial and tax ac-
counting alignment manage earnings to reduce
taxes.
In this paper, we focus on the variation in the
level of earnings management of companies with-
in Europe. We select one common-law country
(UK) and two code-law countries (France and
Germany). These three countries are clearly dis-Vol.36. No. 1.2006 35
tinct from each other in terms of audit environ-
ment. Following the results of Leuz et al. (2003),
France and Germany are in the same institutional
cluster, defined as 'insider economies with less-de-
veloped stock markets, concentrated ownership,
weak investor rights, but strong legal enforce-
ment'. However, France and Germany are very
different in terms of flexibility of audit quality
regime. We examine to what extent the differences
in audit environment in each of the three countries
have an effect on the extent of earnings manage-
ment.
2.2. Audit constraint on earnings management
Evidence has been provided in the US and the
UK that Big Four audit firms constitute a con-
straint on earnings management. Using US data,
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) show that non-
fraudulent clients of Big Four auditors are less
likely to have errors or irregularities, which are
considered to be proxies for earnings management.
In a subsequent study, DeFond and Jiambalvo
(1993) provide evidence that auditor-client dis-
agreements, resulting from incentives to manage
earnings, are more likely to occur in the case of a
Big Four auditor.
Similarly, Becker et al. (1998) provide evidence
that clients of non-Big Four auditors report discre-
tionary accruals that increase income relatively
more than the discretionary accruals reported by
clients of Big Four auditors. Moreover, it was
found that the mean and median of the absolute
value of discretionary accruals are greater for
firms with non-Big Four auditors. Francis et al.
(1999) report for a sample of NASDAQ firms that,
even though Big Four auditors have higher levels
of total accruals, they also have lower amounts of
estimated discretionary accruals. Chung et al.
(2003) find evidence in the US that Big Four audi-
tors influence their clients to adopt more conserva-
tive accounting procedures. For UK firms. Gore et
al. (2001) show that Big Four auditors are more
able to constrain earnings management than non-
Big Four auditors when a high level of non-audit
services is provided.
Despite these consistent findings of a Big Four
audit firm quality effect, it should be noted that
nearly all studies are conducted within Anglo-
Saxon countries. In the context of this study, it can
be questioned whether the Big Four audit firm
quality effect holds in all audit environments. For
example, Francis and Wang (2004) document that
Big Four auditor conservatism is greater in coun-
tries with strong investor protection environments
and a common law legal tradition.
We examine whether Big Four audit firms re-
duce the level of earnings management in the three
European countries (two code law and one com-
mon law) included in our study, to what extent this
quality effect overrides differences in national
audit environments, and more importantly whether
the effect is similar in all three countries.
2.3. Measures of earnings management
Different models have been suggested in the lit-
erature to measure earnings management. Healy
and Whalen (1999), Young (1999) and McNichols
(2000) provide a good overview of the earnings
management literature and the different models
used to measure earnings management. Three dif-
ferent approaches are commonly used to detect
earnings management: (i) aggregate accruals mod-
els; (ii) specific accruals models; and (iii) frequen-
cy of distribution approaches (McNichols, 2000).
Unfortunately, none of the existing approaches
perfectly captures discretionary accruals. Being
aware that there is no best method to estimate dis-
cretionary accruals, we have chosen to examine
working capital accruals to detect earnings man-
agement for the following reasons (see Peasnell et
al., 2000; DeFond and Park, 2001).
First, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Teoh et
al. (1998) argue that working capital accruals are
more susceptible to manipulation than non-work-
ing capital accruals. Beneish (1998) and Young
(1999) argue that focusing exclusively on the
working capital component of total accruals is
"potentially more appealing since continuous (i.e.,
year-on-year) earnings management via the depre-
ciation accrual is likely to have limited potential
due to its visibility and predictability" (Peasnell et
al.,2000).
Second, the commonly used regression-based
accrual estimation methods (e.g. the Jones model)
require large time-series of observations or a large
number of industry-specific observations (e.g.
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Using working
capital accruals, we avoid the regression estima-
tion problems to detect earnings management that
occur outside the US due to smaller sample sizes.
Indeed, one could argue that small-sample prob-
lems may increase the inaccuracy in estimating
discretionary accruals.
3. Development of hypotheses
The main argument in this paper concerns the ef-
fects of differences in national audit environments
on earnings management by companies. The na-
tional audit environments within Europe vary
strongly in terms of independence rules and audi-
tor liability. Hence, it can be expected that the re-
strictions imposed by national audit environments
on earnings management vary. We hypothesise
that:
Hypothesis 1: Companies in EU member states
with strict audit quality regimes report ceteris
paribus relatively lower absolute values of ab-36 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
normal working capital accruals compared to
companies in EU member states with flexible
audit quality regimes.
It can be argued that the expected national audit
environment effect on earnings management is in-
fluenced by the type of audit firm. This expecta-
tion is based on the argument that Big Four audit
firms attempt to control the quality of their audits
across jurisdictions. As the production of their au-
dits is based on internationally recognised brand
names, they have an incentive to provide a uni-
form level of audit quality in different countries.
Consequently, it is hypothesised that:
Hypothesis 2: The magnitude of the absolute
value of abnormal working capital accruals is ce-
teris paribus less affected by the type of national
audit quality regime, in case of a Big Four audit
firm compared to a non-Big Four audit firm.
While the laws and regulations in EU member
states might set a minimum level of audit quality,
companies and their auditors might voluntarily opt
for a higher audit quality level for capital market
reasons. Companies relying on international capi-
tal markets do not only take the restrictions im-
posed by their national market into account, but
also the restrictions of the host country where they
have an additional listing. For example, a German
company listed on the NYSE, is also affected by
the restrictions imposed by the SEC. It can be ex-
pected that this will affect the level of earnings
management by the German company. Indeed, for-
eign companies listed on the NYSE fall under the
jurisdiction of the SEC, which is known to be a de-
manding regulator (Lang et al., 2003). Cross-listed
firms on the NYSE face more requirements in
terms of additional disclosure, reconciliation of net
income and shareholders' equity to US GAAP, and
are subject to a higher litigation risk. However, it
should be acknowledged that prior to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) the requirements for
foreign firms cross-listed on the NYSE were less
strict than for domestic firms. For example, during
the period of our study (1992-2000), the NYSE
permitted listed non-US companies to follow
home country practices with regard to corporate
governance and audit requirements. When the
Sarbanex-Oxley Act comes into force for non-US
companies with a listing on the NYSE (which will
be for fiscal years ending after June 15, 2006), the
flexibility of these non-US companies to follow
home country practices with respect to corporate
governance and audit requirements will be strong-
^ It is noted that the Eighth Directive of 1984 is currently
being revised. The European Commission expects to publish
the revised Eighth Directive in 2006. It is expected that the re-
vised Directive will reduce the large variation in auditing reg-
ulations across EU member states.
ly reduced. Despite the fact that during the period
of study the SEC was less strict for foreign regis-
trants, it can be expected that the US environment
was still more demanding than the EU environ-
ment.
Reliance on international capital markets might
also have an opposing effect on earnings manage-
ment. International capital markets might increase
the incentives for earnings management, for exam-
ple as a result of capital market pressures to meet
management forecasts. Hence, the direction of the
effect of reliance on international capital markets
on earnings management is unclear. Lang et al.
(2003) provide evidence that non-US firms cross-
listed in the US appear to be less aggressive in
terms of earnings management and report in a
more conservative and timely manner compared
with a matched sample of foreign firms not cross-
listed in the US but satisfying the listing criteria
for the exchange on which the cross-listed firm is
traded. However, Joos (2003) argues, 'although
the viewpoint of the bonding role of SEC regula-
tion is well-established in the literature, recent em-
pirical work questions the effectiveness of the SEC
regulation and its enforcement'. A more recent
study by Lang et al. (2004) provides evidence that
the earnings characteristics of non-US firms listed
in the US differ systematically from domestic US-
listed firms. A potential explanation for this result
is that the SEC's enforcement policy is less effec-
tive against foreign firms. Given that the direction
of the effect of a cross-listing on the NYSE is a pri-
ori unclear, we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 3: The absolute value of abnormal
working capital accruals of companies cross-list-
ed on the NYSE will ceteris paribus differ from
the absolute value of abnormal working capital
accruals of companies not relying on this inter-
national source of capital.
4. Member State Audit Environment
The Eighth Directive (84/253/EEC) aimed to
achieve harmonisation of auditing regulation with-
in the EU. However, the Directive was very gener-
al and EU member states were free to maintain and
apply specific national auditing regulations. This
has resulted in a large variation in auditing regula-
tion across EU member states.-' This variation is
clearly shown in the study of Buijink et al. (1996)
providing a detailed description of the auditing
regulations in the member states of the EU. The
countries included in our study (France, Germany
and the UK) also clearly show variation in strict-
ness of auditor independence regulation. We rank
the regulatory systems in the countries included in
this study as follows from a relatively strict audit
quality regime to a more flexible audit quality
regime: France, UK and Germany. This rankingVol.36. No. 1.2006 37
is based on the presence or absence of auditor in-
dependence rules, which aim to promote audit
qtiality in these countries and for which there is
cross-country variation. In particular, we consider
auditor independence rules for listed firms
on: length of audit mandate, rotation of audit part-
ners, number of statutory auditors, approval of
appointment, disclosure of audit fees, provision
of management advisory services, advertising,
peer review, review by regulators, auditors
moving to clients or vice versa, and audit commit-
tees. Furthermore, we compare the risk of litiga-
tion in the three countries under study. Table 1
provides an overview of the presence or absence
of each of these independence rules during the
period under study (1992-2000) based on Buijink
et al. (1996), Ordelheide (2001) and publications
available on the websites of the national
auditing professions (http://www.icaew.co.uk;
http://wwwcncc.fr; http://www.idw.de).
France is the country that has the highest number
of regulations regarding audit quality. In particu-
lar, France imposes restrictions on the minimum
length of the audit mandate, listed firms that need
to consolidate are required to have a joint audit and
the appointment of the statutory auditor needs to
be approved by the stock exchange regulatory au-
thority. The provision of management advisory
services and advertising are not allowed and there
are restrictions on auditors moving to clients or
client personnel moving to audit firms. Statutory
auditors are subject to reviews by peers and regu-
lators. The UK is classified as the country with the
second most strict audit quality regime. In particu-
lar, the UK has a requirement for rotation of audit
partners, audit fees must be disclosed, auditors are
subject to reviews by regulators, and there are re-
strictions on auditors moving to clients or client
personnel moving to audit firms. Furthetmore, the
UK has a high risk of litigation compared to
France and Germany. As shown in Table 1,
Germany has a very limited number of auditor in-
dependence rules to safeguard audit quality.
Moreover, the risk of litigation in Germany is low
(see Blij et al., 1998). Hence, Getrnany has the
most flexible audit quality regime of the three
European countries included in our study. As stat-
'' It is acknowledged that a potential survivorship bias can-
not be ruled out given that we had to use the June 1998
Worldscope database for our sample that stretches back to
1992. However, prior research (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo,
1994) has shown that financially stressed companies engage
on average in more earnings management compared to non-
stressed companies. Hence, including soon-to-be bankrupt
companies will at a minimum not work against finding sup-
port for our hypotheses, and are likely to reinforce our results.
^ Tests were also conducted with taking the average of the
previous two years. This gives very similar results. However,
the data loss was substantial. Therefore, we present the results
using only working capital of the previous year.
ed in Hypothesis 1, we expect that companies
domiciled in countries with a stricter audit quality
regime (France and UK) will engage less in earn-
ings management compared to companies in coun-
tries with a more flexible audit quality regime
(Germany). Subsequently, we test whether the ex-
pected national audit environment effect is miti-
gated by audit firm quality and reliance on an
international capital market, more specifically a
cross-listing on the NYSE.
5. Sample selection
To collect data for this study, we used the August
2002 version of the Osiris database and the June
2000 and June 1998 versions of the Worldscope
database. The Osiris and Worldscope databases
contain historical financial data up to 10 years of
listed firms around the world. We used the most re-
cent version as well as two earlier available ver-
sions of the database to avoid potential
survivorship bias.'' Indeed, companies that went
bankrupt are no longer included in a newer version
of the database. Data are collected for France,
Germany, and the UK for the period 1992-2000.
All three countries have currently sizable and rela-
tively well-developed capital markets. Consistent
with previous research (e.g. Becker et al. 1998), fi-
nancial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utility
companies (SIC 4000-4999) were excluded.
These industries have specific accounting require-
ments, have a high degree of complexity and have
a different acctnal generating process. To reduce
the effect of outliers, we exclude companies in the
top and bottom 1 % of abnormal working capital
accruals. These sampling criteria result in a total
number of usable observations of 17,394 compa-
nies (France: 3,904; Germany: 4,067; UK: 9,423).
All companies in our sample are firms listed on a
stock exchange and 315 or 1.81% of the 17,394
firm-year observations include a cross-listing on
the NYSE.
6. Research design
As argued above, we examine working capital ac-
cruals to detect earnings management because
working capital accruals are more susceptible to
manipulation than non-working capital accruals.
Like DeFond and Park (2001), we define working
capital accmals as the change in non-cash working
capital (WC). Abnormal working capital accruals
(AWCA) are defined as realised working capital
minus normal working capital. Normal working
capital is assumed to be a fixed proportion of sales
(Dechow and Kothari, 1998; DeFond and Park,
2001). We approximate the expected working cap-
ital in the current year by the working capital of
the previous year.^ This gives the following ex-
pression:38 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 1
Overview of auditor Independence rules for listed firms in France, UK and Germany, 1992-2000
Length of the first audit mandate
Length of the renewed audit mandate
Audit partner rotation requirement
Joint audit requirement
Requirement of approval of
appointment of statutory auditor
by any party other than the
appointing party
Disclosure of audit fees




Restrictions on auditors moving
to clients or client personnel







a joint audit is required for a
restricted group of companies,
including listed firms that need
to consolidate
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every 5 years for audit


















Audit committee requirement No No
Sources: Buijink et al. (1996), Ordelheide (2001) and publications available on the websites of the national
auditing professions.
° Private companies are not required to re-elect statutory auditors each year. In that case, the statutory auditor
remains appointed until action is taken to terminate the appointment.
'' Requirement effective for listed firms from 1 September 1997.
' The provision of book-keeping and accounting services is forbidden in the case of listed or public-interest
entities except if the services are of a routine clerical nature. Audit firms within the same legal entity cannot
provide legal services.
'' The provision of book-keeping and accounting services is forbidden.
"= All forms of advertising are forbidden. However, an auditor may provide the name of his firm in academic
articles, speeches, seminars, etc.
' The Bank of England requires banks to have an audit committee unless there are sound reasons for not having
an audit committee. The Cadbury Committee recommended the establishment of audit committees but this was
not mandatory.Vol.36. No. 1.2006 39
AlVCA, - WC, -
where:
SJ
AWCA, = Abnormal working capital accruals in
year t;
we, = Non-cash working capital in year t;
(,_|) = Non-cash working capital in the year
preceding year t;
S, = Sales in year t;
S(,_,) = Sales in the year preceding year t.
Subsequently, the abnormal working capital ac-
cruals of the year are scaled by the sales of that
year. Our empirical analysis will focus on the ab-
solute value of discretionary accruals.* Previous
studies in this area tend to focus on positive dis-
cretionary accruals, the reason being that auditors
have a higher risk of reputation loss in case of up-
ward managed earnings compared to downward
managed earnings. Hence, audit quality differ-
ences would especially be revealed in case of up-
ward managed earnings. However, in the countries
under study, there might be variations in the direc-
tion of the incentives to manage eatnings. For ex-
ample, in more tax-oriented reporting systems
(e.g. Germany), audit quality might be revealed by
limiting the opportunities for negative discre-
tionary accruals. Therefore, we will focus on dis-
cretionary accruals per se. In this respect, Warfield
et al. (1995) also indicated that the absolute value
of discretionary accruals is a good proxy for the
combined effect of income-increasing and income-
decreasing earnings management decisions.
The three main company variables of interest in
this study are: (1) in which EU member state the
company operates; (2) whether the company is au-
dited by a Big Four or a non-Big Four audit fitm;
and (3) whether the company is cross-listed on the
NYSE. The effect of the national audit regime is
measured with a dummy variable for each country
under study. The effect of international capital
markets is measured with a variable indicating
whether the company is cross-listed on the
NYSE.' Of all international capital markets, a
NYSE listing can be expected to have the strongest
effects both in terms of additional constraints and
additional incentives. In terms of regulations re-
garding the quality of financial reporting, the
NYSE and the SEC have the reputation of being
the most restrictive. However, the NYSE is also
known for having strong incentives to meet capital
market expectations. Furthermore, we include a
variable PYLIST for companies anticipating a list-
ing on the NYSE as the reporting behaviour of
these companies is also likely to be different.^ We
consider a period of one year prior to listing.
Consistent with previous studies on earnings
management, the following variables are included
in the model to control for eamings management
incentives. First, we control for the size of a com-
pany proxied by the natural logarithm of total as-
sets. It is argued in the literature that larger firms
prefer downward eamings management due to po-
litical costs (see Young, 1999; Gore et al., 2001).
Second, a leverage or gearing variable is included
in the model. The direction of the effect of this
variable is, a priori, unclear. Highly leveraged
firms may have incentives for income-increasing
eamings management in view of debt covenant vi-
olations (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). However,
financially distressed companies have also large
negative accruals as a result of contractual renego-
tiations providing incentives to reduce eamings
(Becker et al., 1998). Third, we include a perfomn-
ance measure as a control variable. Consistent
with Dechow et al. (1995) and Young (1999), we
include cash flow from operating activities to con-
trol for underlying (poor) performance, which may
induce income-increasing eamings management.
Cash flow from operating activities is computed
indirectly given that direct information on operat-
ing cash flow is not widely available in the coun-
tries included in our study. Following Leuz et al.
(2003), cash flow from operating activities is com-
puted by subtracting the accrual component from
eamings.' Leuz et al. (2003) compute the accrual
component of eamings in a similar way to Dechow
et al. (1995): change in non-cash working capital
minus depreciation and amotiisation. Finally, we
include industry dummies to control for industry
effects on earnings management. Formally, the
model is as follows:
ft AWCA, =
P(,LNASSETS, + Pj
PsOPCF, + I3,IND, + e,
where:
AWCA, = Abnomial working capital accruals in
year t;
UK = Dummy variable (UK company = 1, else 0);
* Note that we use the terms discretionary accruals and ab-
normal working capital accruals interchangeably.
' We requested and received a list from the NYSE with the
names of all non-US companies listed on the NYSE for each
year during the period under study 1992-2000.
* We would like to thank the referee for suggesting to in-
clude this variable.
' A possible consequence is that this may induce a negative
relationship between our eamings management measure, ab-
normal working capital accruals, and our OPCF measure. We
do not believe though that this will affect the impact of our
variables of interest on the magnitude of abnormal working
capital accruals. If we run the multivariate analysis without the
OPCF variable, this does not change the results.40 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for absolute value abnormal working capital accruals
Panel A: Absolute value abnormal working capital accruals across countries























































































LNASSETS - Natural logarithm of total assets;
OPCF = Cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets;
GEAR = Ratio of long term debt to common equity;
NYSE - Dummy variable (Company is listed on the NYSE = 1, else 0);
PYLIST - Dummy variable (Company is listed on the NYSE in year,^, = I, else 0);
Big4 = Dummy variable (Company has Big Four auditor = 1, else 0).
FRA = Dummy variable (French company = 1,
else 0);
Big4( = Dummy variable (Company has Big Four
auditor = 1, else 0);
NYSE; = Dummy variable (Company is listed
on the NYSE = l.elseO);
PYLIST, = Dummy variable (Company is listed
on the NYSE in year,^, - 1, else 0);
LNASSETS, = Natural logarithm of total assets
in year t;
GEAR, = Ratio of long term debt to common
equity in year t;
OPCF, = Cash flow from operating activities in
year t scaled by total assets;'"
i, = Industry dummies (SIC 10-17: Mining
& Construction; SIC 20-39: Manufacturing; SIC
50-59: Wholesale trade; SIC 70-89: Services).
It should be noted that Germany is the country of
reference and SIC 01-09 (agriculture, forestry and
fishing) is the industry of reference.
7. Empirical results
The empirical analysis relates to the period
1992-2000. As argued above, we use abnormal
working capital accruals as a measure for earnings
management. Table 2, Panel A, provides descrip-
tive statistics on the magnitude of abnormal work-
ing capital accruals in France, Germany and the
UK. The table clearly suggests that the magnitude
of earnings management is the highest in Germany
(0.062), followed by the UK (0.057) and France
(0.052). This ranking corresponds with our expect-
ed ranking of countries based on the strictness of
audit quality regime. The test of means, presented
'" As a sensitivity test, we have also scaled operating cash
flows by lagged total assets. This does not change the results.Vol.36. No. 1.2006 41
in Panel B of Table 2, shows that all differences in
earnings management levels between these coun-
tries are significant. The descriptive statistics for
the independent variables are reported in Panel C
of Table 2.
The Pearson correlation matrix presented in
Table 3 shows that while there are several statisti-
cally significant correlations between some of the
explanatory variables, none are highly correlated.
In addition, variance inflation factors (VIFs) are
low which further indicates that there is no multi-
collinearity. The correlation matrix further indi-
cates that there is a positive correlation (0.268)
between a Big Four audit firm and a sample obser-
vation from the UK, while this correlation is neg-
ative for a sample observation from France
(-0.207) and Germany (-0.111). This is consistent
with prior research on audit market structure pro-
viding evidence that Big Four audit market con-
centration is much higher in Anglo-Saxon
countries compared to continental European coun-
tries (Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2004). In
addition, consistent with expectations, there is a
positive correlation between company size and a
Big Four auditor (0.270) and between company
size and a listing on the NYSE (0.264).
Table 4 presents the univariate results for the
pooled sample and the three countries separately.
The results of the pooled sample show that the
magnitude of income-decreasing abnormal accru-
als is not significantly different from the magni-
tude of income-increasing abnormal accruals. This
finding suggests that the companies in our pooled
sample manage their earnings both upwards and
downwards. This is consistent with DeFond and
Park (1997) showing that firms engage in income-
increasing (decreasing) earnings management
when earnings fall below (exceed) the sample me-
dian (by industry and year) and that have good
(poor) future prospects based on analysts' fore-
casts. At a country level, we find that in France and
the UK the magnitude of income-increasing ab-
normal accruals is not significantly different from
the magnitude of income-decreasing abnormal ac-
cruals. However, in Germany we observe that the
magnitude of income-increasing abnormal accru-
als is significantly higher than the magnitude of in-
come-decreasing abnormal accruals. A priori,
considering the importance of presenting positive
earnings, it can be expected that listed companies
have on average stronger incentives for income-in-
creasing earnings management. As argued above,
Germany is considered to have the least strict audit
quality regime compared with France and the UK.
Prior research (Hirst, 1994; Braun, 2001) suggests
that auditors have a higher risk of reputation loss
in cases where earnings are managed upwards
compared with earnings managed downwards.
However, if the audit quality regime is weak and
the risk of litigation is low, auditors may not have
sufficient incentives to be conservative.
The univariate results further show that for the
pooled sample. Big Four auditors are associated
with a significantly lower absolute value of abnor-
mal working capital accruals compared with non-
Big Four auditors, and also with a significantly
lower magnitude of income-increasing and in-
come-decreasing earnings management compared
with non-Big Four auditors. Given that the UK has
the largest number of observations in the pooled
sample, this result may be driven by the UK.
Indeed, we observe at a country level that this
audit quality difference is most significant in the
UK. In Germany, the audit quality difference is
less significant and the differences between Big
Four and non-Big Four auditors are smaller. In
France the audit quality difference is not signifi-
cant. The strong audit quality difference in the UK
could be explained by the fact that the UK has a
much stronger investor protection environment
compared to France and Germany (LaPorta et al.,
1998). Indeed, Francis and Wang (2004) provide
evidence that Big Four auditor conservatism in-
creases in more stringent investor protection envi-
ronments. We explore the Big Four audit quality
difference in the individual countries at a multi-
variate level in Section 8.
Table 4 also shows that the absolute value of ab-
normal working capital accruals is significantly
lower for companies listed on the NYSE for the
pooled sample. Distinguishing between income-
decreasing earnings management and income-in-
creasing management, it appears that only in the
latter category does a NYSE listing have a signifi-
cant effect. At the country level, we observe that
companies listed on the NYSE are associated with
a lower absolute value of abnormal working capi-
tal accruals, but this difference in magnitude is not
significant in the individual countries. This is
probably due to the very small number of observa-
tions with a NYSE listing when conducting the
analysis at country level. It is acknowledged that
in the pooled sample, the number of observations
with a NYSE listing is also small (1.81%). Hence,
caution is needed when drawing strong conclu-
sions about the association between a NYSE list-
ing and the level of earnings management.
Finally, it appears from Table 4 that focusing on
the absolute value of abnormal working capital ac-
cruals gives overall stronger results than either in-
come-increasing or income-decreasing abnormal
working capital accruals. This could be due to the
larger sample size when income-increasing and in-
come-decreasing earnings management are com-
bined, which increases the power of the tests.
Moreover, focusing on the absolute value of ac-
cruals is appropriate as Warfield et al. (1995) show
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*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Variable definitions:
UK = Dummy variable (UK eompany = 1, else 0);
FRA - Dummy variable (Freneh eompany = 1, else 0);
Big4, = Dummy variable (Company has Big Four auditor = 1, else 0);
NYSE, = Dummy variable (Company is listed on the NYSE = 1, else 0);
PYLIST, = Dummy variable (Company is listed on the NYSE in year,^, = 1, else 0);
LNASSETS, = Natural logarithm of total assets in year t;
GEAR, = Ratio of long term debt to eommon equity in year t;
OPCF, = Cash fiow from operating aetivities in year t sealed by total assets;
SIC 10-17 = Mining & Construetion;
SIC 20-39 = Manufaeturing;
SIC 50-59 = Wholesale trade;
SIC 70-89 = Serviees.
" Due to laek of data, we eould not measure eash flow from operating aetivities for all observations. This ex-
plains the difference in number of observations between the univariate results and the multivariate results.
'' It is acknowledged that the adjusted R-Squared is low. However, the purpose of this study is not to develop
a model to explain earnings management. We focus on the impact of the national audit environment, audit firm
quality and international capital markets on the level of earnings management, while controlling for factors that
are associated with earnings management based on prior research. A low adjusted R-Squared is not unusual in
this type of studies (e.g. Becker et al., 1998). This remark also applies to the adjusted R-Squared of Tables 6-8.
to capture the combined effect of income-increas-
ing and income-decreasing earnings management.
Table 5 presents the OLS regression results with
Germany as the country of reference. The multi-
variate results confirm the significant differences
in the magnitude of earnings management across
countries. Companies in the UK and France en-
gage significantly less in earnings management
compared to Germany (p<0.01). This suggests
that a stricter audit environment can reduce on av-
erage the extent to which companies engage in
earnings management. Big Four audit firms do not
appear to constitute a significant constraint on
earnings management. While the univariate re-
sults did provide some evidence of a Big 4 audit
quality effect, the results here do not. We further
explore this by conducting a multivariate analysis
at country level in Section 8. The multivariate re-
sults in T'able 5 further suggest that, surprisingly,
a NYSE listing does not constrain earnings man-
agement, but rather appears to be associated with
a higher absolute value of abnormal working cap-
ital accruals (p<0.01). It is recalled that the uni-
variate results indicated that a NYSE listing
reduces earnings management. This apparent op-
posite result in the multivariate analysis could be
explained by the fact that the multivariate analysis
controls for the type of audit firm: nearly allVol. 36. No. 1.2006 45
NYSE listed companies (97%) are audited by a
Big Four audit firm. The multivariate results also
suggest that the reporting behaviour of companies
planning a listing on the NYSE differs from other
companies in the sample. In particular, it appears
that companies one year prior to a NYSE listing
have a significantly higher level of abnormal
working capital accruals (p<0.10). To reiterate, it
is acknowledged that given the small number of
observations in our sample with a NYSE listing,
or anticipating such a listing, caution is needed
when drawing strong conclusions about the asso-
ciation between a NYSE listing and the magni-
tude of accruals.
Finally, Table 5 shows for the control variables
that larger companies engage significantly less in
earnings management (p<0.01), and financially
stressed companies (low or negative cash flow
from operating activities) engage significantly
more in earnings management (p<0.01), which is
consistent with prior literature (e.g. DeFond and
Jiambalvo, 1994). Furthermore, there are signifi-
cant differences in the level of earnings manage-
ment across industries in our samples: companies
in the mining and construction industry and the
services industry have a higher level of abnormal
working capital accruals compared to companies
in the agriculture, forestry and fishing industry. In
addition, companies in the manufacturing and
wholesale industry have lower abnormal working
capital accruals compared with the agriculture,
forestry and fishing industry.
In order to test whether the potential constraint
of Big Four auditors on earnings management is
uniform across countries, the regression analysis is
performed on the sample of companies with a Big
Four auditor and the sample of companies with a
non-Big Four auditor separately. The results are
presented in Table 6, Panel A and B.
The multivariate analysis in Panel A shows that
the country differences remain significant even
though all companies are audited by a Big Four
audit firm (p<0.01). In other words, the Big Four
audit firm quality effect appears not sufficiently
strong to remove the effects of national audit envi-
ronments on earnings management. This finding
implies that Big Four audit firms do not constitute
a uniform constraint on earnings management. The
positive association between a NYSE listing and
earnings management is also not eliminated by Big
Four auditors, which is not surprising given that
nearly all companies in our sample with a NYSE
listing are audited by a Big Four audit firm. The
OLS regression results for the non-Big Four audit
firm sample are presented in Panel B of Table 6.
As expected, the country differences remain: com-
panies in France and the UK audited by a non-Big
Four audit firm have significantly lower levels of
abnormal working capital accruals compared to
German companies audited by a non-Big Four
audit firm. While a planned listing on the NYSE is
associated with a significantly higher level of ab-
normal working capital accruals, an actual NYSE
listing is not a significant variable in the non-Big
Four audit firm sample. This is most likely due to
the small sample size of non-Big Four audit firm
clients listed at the NYSE.
8. Sensitivity analyses
To test the robustness of our results, we have per-
formed the following sensitivity analyses. First,
we have included year dummies in our model. This
does not change the results (not reported) for our
variables of interest. Second, we have used two ad-
ditional models to measure accruals: current ac-
cruals and total accruals. Following Myers et al.
(2003), we measure current accruals as: (change in
current assets - change in cash and cash equiva-
lents) - (change in current liabilities - change in
short-term debt and current portion of long-term
debt). Current accruals are subsequently scaled by
average total assets. Following Dechow et al.
(1995), we measure total accruals as: (change in
current assets - change in cash and cash equiva-
lents) - (change in current liabilities - change in
short-term debt and current portion of long-term
debt) - depreciation and amortisation. Total accru-
als are subsequently scaled by prior-year total as-
sets. Table 7, Panel A, presents the results using
these two alternative accruals measures. These re-
sults show that companies in France and the UK
have a significantly lower absolute value of cur-
rent and total accruals (p<0.01) compared with
companies in Germany. This confirms our finding
derived from Table 5 that the magnitude of earn-
ings management is not uniform across the three
European countries and suggests that a stricter
audit environment constitutes a constraint on earn-
ings management. The results further show that
companies with a Big Four auditor do not have
significantly lower current and total accruals in ab-
solute value, consistent with the results from Table
5. We explore the Big Four auditor quality effect at
country level further below. Companies cross-list-
ed on the NYSE appear to have significant higher
absolute levels of current and total accruals
(p<0.01), which is consistent with the finding in
Table 5 for abnormal working capital accruals.
However, companies planning a listing on the
NYSE do not appear to have a significant different
magnitude of current and total accruals. It is re-
called that the number of companies in our sample
with a NYSE listing, or anticipating a NYSE list-
ing, is low, so caution is needed when generalizing
these results. When the regression analysis with
current and total accruals as dependent variable is
performed on the sample of companies with a Big
Four audit firm and the sample of companies with46 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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OLS regression results for Big Four and
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Table 7
Sensitivity analyses
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Table 7
Sensitivity analyses (continued)
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a non-Big Four audit firm separately, we observe
that the country differences in terms of level of
earnings management remain significant (p<0.01).
This is consistent with the finding derived from
Table 6 that country differences remain significant
even in the presence of a Big Four audit firm. In
other words, the limits placed by Big Four audit
firms on earnings management do not appear to be
uniform across countries. Given that nearly all
companies in our sample with a NYSE listing have
a Big Four auditor, it is not surprising that the pos-
itive association between a NYSE listing and the
level of accruals remains significant (p<0.01) in
the subsample of companies with a Big Four audit
firm, and not in the subsample of companies with
a non-Big Four audit firm.
To explore the Big Four audit quality effect in
more detail, we have included two interaction
dummies, Big4*UK and Big4*FRA in our model.
The results, presented in Table 7 Panel B, show an
expected significant negative coefficient for the
B4*UK variable with all our accruals measures,
while the coefficient for the Big4*FRA variable is
not significant for any of the accruals measures.
To further explore these findings, we have con-
ducted a multivariate analysis for the individual
country samples. The results are presented in Table
8. At a national level, these results indicate that
only in the UK are Big Four audit firms signifi-
cantly associated with lower levels of accruals. In
France and Germany, there is no significant differ-
ence between Big Four auditors and non-Big Four
auditors. These findings are in line with Francis
and Wang (2004), showing that the effect of Big
Four audit firm conservatism increases with the
level of investor protection, including the ability to
sue. Given that the UK has a stronger level of in-
vestor protection compared with France and
Germany, this could explain why we only observe
a Big Four audit firm quality effect in the UK, and
not in France and Germany. At the individual
country level, we further observe a positive asso-
ciation between a NYSE listing and the level of
abnormal working capital accruals in the UK, but
not in France and Germany. The latter could be
due to lack of power given the very small number
of observations with a NYSE listing in France and
Germany. Overall, the results of the sensitivity
analyses reinforce our findings that national differ-
ences in earnings management are dominant and
remain significant even in the presence of a Big
Four audit firm or a cross-listing on the NYSE.
9. Summary and conclusions
The purpose of this study was to examine the ef-
fects of national audit environment differences on
earnings management. In addition, the extent to
which national differences in earnings manage-
ment are limited by audit firm quality and reliance
on international capital markets was studied.
Our results provide evidence that the magnitude
of earnings management is not uniform across the
three European countries included in our study and
that a stricter audit environment can reduce the
magnitude of earnings management, irrespective
of the type of auditor (Big Four audit firm or non-
Big Four audit firm). In particular, the results sug-
gest that companies in countries with flexible audit
quality regimes report significantly higher ab-
solute values of discretionary accruals compared
to companies in countries with strict audit quality
regimes. These observed EU member states' dif-
ferences remain significant even in the presence of
a Big Four audit firm. This finding implies that the
limits placed by Big Four audit firms on earnings
management are not uniform across countries.
Furthermore, we find no evidence of a global Big
Four audit quality effect in Europe. In particular.
Big Four audit firm conservatism appears to be
present only in the UK, and not in France and
Germany. This reinforces our finding that national
differences in earnings management are dominant
and are not removed by the presence of a Big Four
audit firm. This is also consistent with the finding
of Francis and Wang (2004) that Big Four auditor
conservatism increases in more stringent investor
protection environments. Finally, our results with
respect to the incidence of earnings management
by companies attracting international sources of
capital suggest that a NYSE listing does not con-
straint earnings management but is rather associat-
ed with higher levels of accruals. This finding puts
the effectiveness of the bonding role of SEC regu-
lation for non-US firms into question. This con-
cern is consistent with other recent empirical work
questioning the effectiveness of SEC regulation
and its enforcement regarding foreign listed firms
(Joos, 2003; Lang et al., 2004).
The evidence provided in this study is relevant
for the current debate in the European Union on
the harmonisation of auditing. For the comparabil-
ity of earnings, not only the standardisation of fi-
nancial reporting is important but also the
standardisation of enforcement mechanisms as
embodied in the national audit environment and
the quality of audit firms. The results of this study
suggest that the enforcement of financial reporting
still varies strongly across member states of the
EU.
The results of this study are subject to the fol-
lowing limitations. First, as in almost every cross-
country study, it can be questioned whether the
observed differences between countries are really
attributable to differences in earnings manage-
ment. One could argue that they are driven by eco-
nomic and institutional differences. We have partly
controlled for economic differences by including
industry differences. In addition, we believe that50 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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there are no major differences in the underlying
economic situation between the three countries in
the sample during the period under study.
Therefore, the risk that economic differences have
a significant impact on the results is considered to
be low. It is acknowledged that there are institu-
tional differences other than national audit envi-
ronment between the countries under study. As
pointed out by Leuz et al. (2003), it is difficult
to fully control for the potential impact of other in-
stitutional factors since they are often complemen-
tary and as such difficult to disentangle. However,
an interesting contribution of our paper is the find-
ing of a significantly different level of earnings
management between companies of countries
(France and Germany) belonging to the same in-
stitutional cluster in terms of level of investor pro-
tection (Leuz et al., 2003), but that are clearly
distinct in terms of flexibility of the audit quality
regime.
Second, consistent with previous research on
earnings management, we have controlled for theVol.36. No. 1.2006 51
following earnings management incentives: size,
leverage and performance. Nonetheless, it is ac-
knowledged that there may be other incentives to
manage earnings across the countries in the sample
that have not been controlled for.
Finally, we are aware of the limitations of the
working capital accruals model to detect earnings
management. However, we have performed sensi-
tivity analyses using alternative earnings manage-
ment measures and overall the results appear to be
robust.
Future research may benefit from examining
whether the extent of earnings management be-
tween companies with similar earnings manage-
ment incentives from different countries across the
world differs as a function of auditor independence
regulation and risk of litigation in their country of
domicile. An attempt in this direction is made by
Meuwissen et al. (2004). Future research could
also look into the broad issue of the complex in-
teraction between governance, institutional envi-
ronment and financial reporting quality. It can be
argued that financial reporting quality is endoge-
nous and potentially depends on several inter-re-
lated factors such as institutional environment,
capital markets, corporate governance regime and
audit regime.
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